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VIII. WILLS AND ESTATES
A. CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL
In Tarr v. Hicks,1 the testatrix entered into a contract with her
children and stepchildren to make a will devising her estate and
specific real property to them. The will, as construed,' was not in
accordance with the contract and the plaintiff's, successors to the
interests of a deceased son of the testatrix and the successors to the
interests of a deceased stepdaughter of the testatrix, sought to en-
force distribution of the estate in accordance with the contract.
The defendant, daughter of testatrix, sought to prove by parol
evidence that there was no consideration flowing from the children
and stepchildren to support the testatrix's agreement to make the
will. It appeared from the authorities cited by the defendant that
she contended the agreement was a mere recital of consideration,
and as such could be explained by parol evidence.6
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination
that parol evidence was inadmissible "to vary and wipe out essential
terms of a written contract."' The court has refused admission of
parol evidence to vary consideration when the contract was explicit,
the consideration expressed and definite, and such expression of
consideration contractual, going to the essence of the contract, 8 or
to prove that the consideration was wholly different from that de-
scribed in the contract?
The court also considered the question "whether execution of
the agreement served to divest [the testatrix] of any title that she
1393 P.2d 557 (Colo. 1964).
2 in re Estate of Newby, 146 Colo. 296, 361 P.2d 622 (1961).
3 393 P.2d at 560. The only variation between the will and the contract was that in
the contract the testatrix was to give to her two children an individual one-half
of her estate and her five stepchildren the other undivided one-half of her estate.
By her will she gave each child an undivided one-fourth and to each stepchild an un-
divided one-tenth.
4 393 P.2d at 563.
5 In substance the agreement provided: that the children and stepchildren assign to
the testatrix all rights that they had to the estate of Newby, Sr.; that there be no
probate of his estate; that any advances received from Newby, Sr., by any of the
parties should be considered gifts; that no one of the parties shall have any claim
against any other by reason of such gifts or advancements; that the children and
stepchildren will, at all times, treat the testatrix with respect and consideration;
and that the children and stepchildren will not request any personal loans or ad-
vances from the testatrix.
6 Trustee Co. v. Bresnahan, 119 Colo. 311, 203 P.2d 499 (1949); Gibbons v.
Joseph Gibbons Consol. Min. & Mill Co., 37 Colo. 96, 86 Pac. 94 (1906); Fech-
heimer v. Trounstine, 15 Colo. 386, 24 Pac. 882 (1890). But see Hickman-Lunbeck
Grocery Co. v. Hager, 75 Colo. 554, 227 Pac. 829 (1924), (contract feature may
not be contradicted or varied by parol, in the absence of fraud or mistake).
7393 P.2d at 562.
8 Grand Junction Gospel Tabernacle v. Orvis, 113 Colo. 408, 157 P.2d 619 (1945).
9 Collins v. Shaffer, 66 Colo. 84, 179 Pac. 152 (1919).
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had and to vest the portion so divested in the children and step-
children.""
The court resolved this issue by relying on precedent from
other jurisdictions, citing In re Johnson's Estate" an Illinois decision,
and Harris v. Harris," a West Virginia decision. Reiterating lan-
guage from both of these cases, the Colorado Supreme Court af-
firmed distribution of the property in conformity with the agree-
ment, concluding that the agreement divested the testatrix of her fee
simple title and vested in the children and stepchildren an inter-
est in the property. However, according to In re Johnson's Estate
this holding should be limited to contracts which devise specific
and designated property.4
It is not clear whether the court in Tarr accepted or rejected
the theory that the testatrix held the legal title in trust for the
beneficiaries. However, the court in previous cases has acceped this
theory, 5 as have other jurisdictions"6 and some text writers. 7
The trust theory is commonly used in the case of a specifically
enforceable executory contract for the sale of land. It is asserted
that the vendor holds the legal title in trust for the vendee and
the vendee holds the equitable title and is a trustee of the purchase
money for the vendor. The trust theory finds its basis in the reas-
oning that because equity will decree specific performance and re-
quire the vendor to transfer his legal interest to the purchaser and
the purchaser to transfer the purchase price to the vendor, there
10 393 P.2d at 563.
11 389 111. 425, 59 N.E.2d 825 (1945).
12 130 W. Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947).
13 "Where the contract is to devise specific and designated property, like a piece of
real estate, the equitable title vests in the beneficiaries, under the contract. There-
after the testator holds the legal title in trust for their benefit." Harris v. Harris, 389
Ill. 425, 428, 59 N.E.2d 825, 826-27 '(1945). "After it [the contract] was made he
held the legal title to the real estate in trust for their benefit until his death . ..
By the contract, and at the time it was entered into, he effectively disposed of the
equitable title to the land ...." In re Johnson's Estate, 130 W. Va. 100, 107, 43
S.E.2d 225, 229 (1947).
14 In this case the court held that:
Where the contract is to bequeath a definite sum of money or property
of specific value, no title passes under the contract, but the beneficiaries
become creditors of the estate to that extent. Where there is a breach of the
contract to make the bequest, the remedy is a claim against the estate in the
nature of a claim for damages for such breach. 389 I11. at 428, 59 N.E.2d
at 827.
15Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v. Carlson, 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
16Hood v. United States, 256 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1958), Maudre v. Humphreys, 83
W. Va. 307, 98 S.E. 259 (1919) ; Rhodes v. Meredith, 260 Ill. 138, 102 N.E. 1063
(1913) ; Breckwith v. Clark, 188 Fed. 171 (8th Cir. 1911) ; Estate of Dwyer, 159
Cal. 664, 115 Pac. 235 (1911) ; House v. Jackson, 24 Ore. 89, 32 Pac. 1027 (1893).
1' 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 105 (4th ed. 1918); 1 STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 790 (12th ed. 1877).
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are two bare legal interests on one hand, and a beneficial equitable
interest on the other, and thus two trusts.18
This reasoning is somewhat tenuous in view of the Restate-
ment, " and other commentators who express the opinion that the
relationship created is more nearly analogous to that of a mortgagor
and mortgagee, 0 and that "this is a loose, inaccurate use of the
word 'trust.' "21
Although there are no Colorado cases with fact situations
similar to that in the present case, the West Virginia court stated
in Harris that a contract to make a will is "analogous, with respect
to the immediate transfer of the equitable title to property, to a
contract for the sale of land."' It follows that if such an analogy
is accurate, the Colorado Supreme Court could have reached the
same result utilizing its own precedent without reference to de-
cisions of foreign jurisdictions. In Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v.
Carlson,3 the court considered the question whether the vendee
was subject to restrictive covenants formulated and recorded sub-
sequent to payment of the consideration and to taking possession
of the land by the vendee. It held that "when payments are fully
made, the full equitable title vests in the vendee, and the vendor
retains the naked legal title in trust for him."24 In another action,
to establish the priority of liens against the assets of a bankrupt-
18 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 18, at 118 (2d ed. 1965).
19 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 13 (1957), provides:
Trusts and Contract to Convey-
A contract to convey property is not a trust, whether or not the contract
is specifically enforceable.
If the contract is specifically enforceable, the purchaser acquires an
equitable interest in the property, but the relation between the vendor and
purchaser, unlike that between trustee and beneficiary, is not a fiduciary
one; it is more nearly analogous to a mortgage.
20 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118; 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 13, at 133, 134 (2d ed.
1956) says:
As a consequence of the fact that a contract for the purchase and sale of
land is specifically enforceable, the purchaser is held to acquire an equitable
interest in the land before it is conveyed to him. But of course it is clear
enough that the vendor of land is in no real sense a trustee for the pur-
chaser. It would be more nearly appropriate to speak of him as a mortgagee
since he may retain the title to the land as security for the unpaid purchase
price.
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 927, at 2604 (Rev. ed. 1936) states:
Because of the unconditional duty of each party, it is held that from the
formation of the contract, though it is not performable until a future day,
the purchaser is the owner in equity, and that the vendor holds the legal
title merely as security for the payment of the price; in other words, that
the relation is substantially that of mortgagor and mortgagee.
21 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118. For an adverse criticism of this use of trust
see Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common
Law, 9 HARv. L. REV. 106, 117 (1895).
22 130 W. Va. at 109, 43 S.E.2d at 230.
23 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
24 Id. at 414.
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vendee's estate, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the
case of In re Ben Boldt, Jr., Floral Co.' stated:
A binding contract for the sale and purchase of land, under
which payments on the purchase price are to be made in the future,
vests an equitable title to the land in the purchaser from the date
of the execution of the contract.2
Therefore, using these two Colorado cases, the court could
have reached the same result.
B. INHERITANCE TAX ON PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
In People v. Faricy," the Inheritance Tax Commissioner as-
sessed an inheritance tax on the proceeds of four insurance policies
naming the surviving widow as beneficiary. As provided by the
terms of the collateral security agreement, the proceeds of the policies
were paid to the assigned who deducted the amount of the loan
and remitted the balance to the surviving widow. The Commissioner
contended the proceeds of the policies were subject to an inheri-
tance tax2" bcause all the policies were assigned.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the tax liability was not
warranted because in determining the deductions from the gross
estate,29 the indebtedness of the deceased to the assignee was not
included. The court concluded that the estate had paid an inheritance
tax inflated by an amount which should have been offset by the
indebtedness satisfied by the assigned proceeds.
The court distinguished this case from People v. Mason,3" in
which it had held taxable the proceeds of an insurance policy which
were applied to reduce the amount of the decedent's indebtedness
to a creditor-beneficiary. In determining the net value of the estate
subject to inheritance tax, the debt secured by the policies in the
principal case had not been claimed as a deducation, whereas in
Mason the debt was allowed as a deduction. Therefore the interpre-
tation of the statute by the supreme court in Mason3 still appears
to be valid.
Richard E. Mitchell
- 37 F.2d 499 (10th Cir. 1930).
2ld. at 502.
27 395 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1964).
28CoLo. REV. STAT. § 138-3-9(1) (1963) which establishes that: "Proceeds of in-
surance policies on the life of a decedent payable in such manner as to be subject
to the claims against his estate or to distribution as a part thereof shall be taxable."
29 COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-3-16 (1963).
30 144 Colo. 151, 256 P.2d 257 (1960).
31 In that case the court held:
[I]t seems clear that the first paragraph [COLO. REV. STAT. § 138-3-9
(1963)] is intended to cover only those policies which are made payable
directly or indirectly to the estate. With respect to policies subject to claims
against the estate or to distribution as a part thereof, the exemption provi-
sion is inapplicable and such policies are taxable in the full amount thereof.
144 Colo. at 155.
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